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LIMITATION oF ACTioNs-CoNVERSION-Defendant purchased and went 
into possession of land in 1944 at which time a logging donkey was upon the 
land. The donkey had been on defendant's land without having been moved 
or used since 1942. From 1944 to 1952 defendant made numerous inquiries 
as to the ownership of the donkey without success. Through various con-
veyances, beginning in 1946, and without any transfer of possession, plaintiff 
acquired title to the donkey in 1952. In May 1952, in order to further develop 
his land, defendant sold the donkey. In a suit by plaintiff for conversion of 
the donkey, the lower court ruled that the action was barred in 1945 by the 
three-year statute of limitations.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. Plaintiff's cause 
of action accrued when the donkey came to rest on defendant's land, since the 
title of the true owner was then reduced to a right of immediate possession or 
to a cause of action in the event immediate possession was denied.2 Jones v. 
Jacobson, (Wash. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 979. 
Statutes of limitations do not begin to run until plaintiff has a cause of 
action that contains all the elements necessary to prosecute successfully such an 
action.3 The issue in cases involving statutes of limitations thus becomes one 
of determining what elements constitute a particular action. A cause of action 
in conversion accrues when the defendant has asserted such dominion over 
property belonging to plaintiff as to be inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff, 
or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such rights.4 Such acts therefore 
1 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (1951) tit. 4, §4.16.080. 
2 There is some indication that the lower court ruled that the donkey had been aban-
doned. However, on appeal, this court proceeded on the as5\1mption that such an aban-
donment had not taken place. 
3 Smith v. Seattle, 18 Wash. 484, 51 P. 1057 (1898); Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 
9 Wash. (2d) 214, 144 P. (2d) 526 (1941). 
4 Ashbrook v. Hammer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 106 S.W. (2d) 776; Ray v. Pilgrim 
Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E. (2d) 218 (1945); Martin v. Sikes, 38 
Wash. (2d) 274, 229 P. (2d) 546 (1951). 
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may include a wrongful assertion of ownership as a denial of plaintiff's interest 
in the property but in any event must include a wrongful deprivation of plain-
tiff's possessory interests. It follows from this that when defendant has come 
into possession of plaintiff's property lawfully, a mere detention or failure to 
deliver does not constitute a conversion, there being no assertion of defendant's, 
or denial of plaintiff's, right in the property.5 Under such circumstances de-
fendant, to raise a cause of action, must manifest some evidence of adverse 
possession or must refuse delivery of possession on a demand by plaintiff.6 
The evidence in the principal case indicates that defendant, prior to his sale 
of the donkey, did not indicate any intent toward the property that was adverse 
to the interest of the owner. By seeking out the true owner over a period 
of eight years, he manifested his recognition of the true owner's title to the 
property, and until the sale of the property was not guilty of a conversion. 
The general rule is that where a demand is necessary to raise a cause of action, 
the statute of limitations does not start running until such demand is made.7 
However, where the power to raise the cause of action is in the owner and he 
is under no disabiHty, courts of equity have been unwilling to allow him to 
defeat the policy of the statute of limitations by neglecting to make a demand. 
Thus by in effect applying an equitable doctrine of laches, the statute of limita-
tions will be held to have started to run within a reasonable time after the 
owner could have made a demand.8 What constitutes a reasonable time within 
which a demand will have been presumed to have been made depends on the 
circumstances but is usually held to be the period of the statute of limitations 
for bringing the action.9 The court in the principal case based its decision on the 
finding that plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the chattel came to rest 
on the land but at the same time admitted that such cause of action came 
into being only in the event a request for immediate possession was denied. 
Since no demand of the defendant was ever made,. the court had no basis for 
5 Obviously, if defendant acquires possession by unlawful means, a cause of action for 
conversion arises immediately and without further acts by plaintiff or defendant. 
6 Clay County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226 Ala. 394, 147 S. 407 (1933); Mueller 
v. Technical Devices Corp., 8 N.J. 201, 84 A. (2d) 620 (1951); Lockit Cap Co. v. Globe 
Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 P. 813 (1930); Hanson v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co., 
147 Wash. 104, 265 P. 159 (1928); Persson v. McKay Coal Co., 200 Wash. 75, 92 P. 
(2d) ll08 (1939). The courts generally agree that where a demand by plaintiff would 
be unavailing, it is not necessary to raise a cause of action. See Hochstetler v. Graber, 78 
N.D. 90, 48 N.W. (2d) 15 (1951). If plaintiff had chosen to sue the present owner in 
replevin, he would have been subject to the same requirement, i.e., a timely demand must 
be made on a party who withholds possession lawfully. Edison Oyster Co. v. Pioneer 
Oyster Co., 22 Wash. (2d) 616, 157 P. (2d) 302 (1945). 
7Washington Security Co. v. State, 9 Wash. (2d) 197, ll4 P. (2d) 965 (1941); 
First Mortgage Loan Co. v. Allwein, 186 Okla. 491, 98 P. (2d) 910 (1940); Wilson v. 
Weber County, 100 Utah 141, lll P. (2d) 147 (1941); Kaplan v. Reid Bros., 104 Cal. 
App. 268, 285 P. 868 (1930). 
8 Gossard v. Gossard, (10th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) lll; Ilse v. Burgess, 28 Cal. App. 
(2d) 654, 83 P. (2d) 527 (1938); Bell v. Brady, 346 Pa. 666, 31 A. (2d) 547 (1943). 
See also 23 A.L.R. 10 (1923), 128 A.L.R. 158 (1940). 
9 Ilse v. Burgess, note 8 supra; Fallon v. Fallon, 110 Minn. 213, 124 N.W. 994 
(1910); Beard v. Citizen's Bank of Memphis, (Mo. 1931) 37 S.W. (2d) 678. 
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holding that plaintiff had a good cause of action in conversion. The court's 
seemingly contradictory language is a result of its determination to find some 
basis for denying plaintiff his cause of action while at the same time recognizing 
that a cause of action is necessary to start a statute of limitations running. The 
court could have reached the same result by applying the !aches concept which 
would estop plaintiff from denying that a demand and refusal was made when 
defendant asserted the statute of limitations defense to plaintiff's suit in con-
version. In this way, the court would have avoided the confusion and am-
biguity that prevails in the principal case. Some have raised objections to such 
an application of equitable estoppel on the grounds that defendant at all times 
had it in his power to start the statute running by manifesting some indication 
of adverse possession, and that until he did there could be no cause to start 
the statute. However, if such were the law plaintiff by his laches could force 
defendant to remain his in~oluntary bailee, a position that defendant could 
avoid only by committing some act that would subject him to a suit for con-
version. In addition to imposing all the risks and burdens attendant on such 
a suit on the defendant, such a result would in effect be tantamount to requiring 
an innocent party to become a wrongdoer in order to create rights against him 
in another party who by his willful delay has avoided such rights. The equit-
able doctrine of !aches was developed to avoid anomalies and it should be 
applied in cases where circumstances and policy warrant it. 
Irving L. Halpern 
